Grid watch

  • 2,316 MW Kenya peak demand
  • 3,243 MW Installed capacity
  • 89 % Renewable share
  • 3.42 KSh/kWh Fuel cost charge
  • 184.5 KSh/l Super petrol, Nairobi
  • 9.7 m Households connected

Indicative figures, updated by the desk

Finance

How an African power project gets financed

Between an idea and a working plant sit a power purchase agreement, a pile of due diligence and about four years. Here is the sequence.

Abstract stacked bar chart
Photo: Energy Siren

An independent power producer is not really selling electricity. It is selling a twenty-year contractual promise, and then borrowing against it. Once that is clear, the rest of the structure follows logically.

Stage one: development, at the developer's risk#

Someone identifies a site, secures land rights, commissions resource studies, runs environmental and social assessments, and applies for permits. All of this is paid for before any revenue exists and before any lender is committed.

If the project dies at this stage — the resource is weaker than modelled, the land title is contested, the permit is refused — the money is gone. Development capital is therefore the most expensive money in the chain, and it prices accordingly.

Stage two: the power purchase agreement#

The PPA is a long-term contract with an offtaker, usually the national utility, to buy the plant's output at an agreed price for an agreed period.

Everything downstream depends on it. Lenders are not lending against turbines; they are lending against a predictable revenue stream. The bankability of a PPA turns on a handful of clauses:

  • Tenor. Long enough to amortise the debt.
  • Tariff structure. Fixed, indexed, or split into capacity and energy payments.
  • Take-or-pay obligations. Does the offtaker pay when it cannot take the power?
  • Currency. Which currency the tariff is denominated and paid in.
  • Termination and change-in-law. What happens if policy shifts.

Stage three: the credit question nobody says out loud#

The central issue in most African power financings is not the sun, the wind or the steam. It is whether the utility on the other side of the PPA will still be paying in year twelve.

Many regional utilities carry structural deficits. Lenders respond by demanding credit support: escrow accounts, letters of credit, a sovereign guarantee, or political risk insurance and partial risk guarantees from development finance institutions.

Support instrumentCoversProvided by
Escrow accountShort payment gapsOfftaker
Letter of creditMissed invoicesCommercial bank
Sovereign guaranteeOfftaker defaultGovernment
Political risk insuranceExpropriation, transfer restrictionDFI or insurer
Partial risk guaranteeSpecified government obligationsMultilateral

Each layer costs money and appears in the tariff. Complaints that African power tariffs are high often trace back to this stack rather than to construction cost.

Stage four: financial close and construction#

Debt and equity are documented together. A special purpose vehicle owns the plant, holds the PPA, and services the debt from project revenue with no recourse to the sponsors' other assets.

Construction is then a schedule-and-cost problem with the developer's equity at stake. Delay costs are contractual and specific: an EPC contractor that misses a date pays liquidated damages.

Project finance is the practice of putting a contract in a box, lending to the box, and agreeing in advance who loses what if the box breaks.

The structural logic

Stage five: operations, and the currency problem#

Once running, the plant sells power and repays debt on a fixed schedule. The residual structural risk is currency: debt is often denominated in dollars, while the utility collects revenue in local currency. A sharp depreciation raises the local-currency cost of servicing the same dollar debt.

This is one reason local-currency lending and domestic institutional capital keep appearing in policy discussions across the continent. It removes a mismatch that no amount of good operations can hedge away.

Sources and further reading